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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 07/07/2011

Accident number: 712

Accident time: 11:15

Accident Date: 27/06/2009

Where it occurred: AF/0108/00560,
MF0126, Qalai-eBadal Village,
Paghman District,
Kabul Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 30/07/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: rocks/stones
steep slope
Date last modified: 07/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
use of pick (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File last saved: 30th July 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-05 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the de-mining accident
involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] DT-05. The accident occurred at 11:15
on 27 June 2009 at minefield number AF/0108/00560/MF0126, located in Qalai-e-Badal
village, Paghman district of Kabul province.
SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF/0108/00560/MF0126 is located on the top of a mountain; it is a rocky and a
steep sloping area and it will take around 45 minutes to reach to the site from admin area.
This area was contaminated by Russian troops in 1981 to protect their positions from the
attacks of Mujahedeen. LIS covered this area as one SHA in 2004, but during recent polygon
survey operations, it has been divided to 7 minefields. So for 2 of the minefields have been
completed there. Several accidents happened on animals in mentioned area; the recent
accident occurred on 18th April 09, a nomad woman was injured.
On 18 April 2009 [Demining group] DT-05 started clearance operation on mentioned task,
they cleared around 19830 sqm area and found/destroyed 4 anti-personnel mines and 2 UXO
till the accident time. On 27 June 2009 at 11:15 am the deminer [the Victim] was working in
his clearance lane, he found a signal behind some stones, the investigation of signal was
impossible with bayonet so he informed the section leader and sought his advice. Section
leader instructed him to use pick, but a stone in front of pinpointed signal did not let the pick to
be used easily. Therefore, the deminer wanted to remove it, during this operation as the pick
was used by force, it slipped over and touched the pinpointed signal and caused the accident.
As the deminer was fully dressed with PPE, therefore, he got superficial injury on his right
hand.
CONCLUSIONS:
The accident occurred because of carelessness of de-miner in terms of removing stone with
pick in an impatient way. But the consequence of accident is a superficial injury to the right
hand of the deminer because of being fully dressed with PPE.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

All the command groups are to make sure that the deminers are working to the
approved procedures and also while giving any advice to the deminers, make sure
that they are implementing the given advice correctly.

•

The [Demining group] is recommended to further improve the command and control
skill of the command group.

•

The findings of internal and external investigation reports and lessons learned are to
be further circulated among all the teams and make sure that the main contributing
factors are well understood by all the deminers.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 897

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "superficial injury to the right hand".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Unavoidable because the Victim was working
as directed (to approved SOPs) when the accident occurred. The secondary cause is listed
as Inadequate equipment because the pick-axe is not a suitable tool to use for the delicate
removal of stones. However, the ground conditions may have been such that a detonation
was inevitable.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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